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From August 2000 through January 2001, a large epi-
demic of Ebola hemorrhagic fever occurred in Uganda, with
425 cases and 224 deaths. Starting from three laboratory-
confirmed cases, we traced the chains of transmission for
three generations, until we reached the primary case-
patients (i.e., persons with an unidentified source of infec-
tion). We then prospectively identified the other contacts in
whom the disease had developed. To identify the risk fac-
tors associated with transmission, we interviewed both
healthy and ill contacts (or their proxies) who had been
reported by the case-patients (or their proxies) and who
met the criteria set for contact tracing during surveillance.
The patterns of exposure of 24 case-patients and 65
healthy contacts were defined, and crude and adjusted
prevalence proportion ratios (PPR) were estimated for dif-
ferent types of exposure. Contact with the patient’s body
fluids (PPR = 4.61%, 95% confidence interval 1.73 to
12.29) was the strongest risk factor, although transmission
through fomites also seems possible.
E
bola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) is a severe viral disease
caused by three of the four species of “Ebola-like
viruses” (1), which are probably maintained in an as-yet-
undefined natural reservoir in the rain forests of Africa (2).
Epidemics occur when an infectious case-patient is intro-
duced into a susceptible population. The first recognized
epidemics occurred almost simultaneously in 1976 in
southern Sudan (284 cases and 117 deaths) (3) and in a
nearby region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (318
cases and 280 deaths) (4). A major mode of transmission
was within hospitals, especially in the early stages of the
outbreaks. Person-to-person transmission also occurred
outside the hospital setting, with numerous community-
acquired cases (3,4).
In 1995, another large epidemic occurred in Kikwit, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 315 cases and
244 deaths (5). The primary mode of transmission was per-
son-to-person transmission to household members who
had had direct contact with sick persons or their body flu-
ids, especially during the late stage of the disease (6).
However, the source of infection remained unknown for 12
case-patients, which led to the suspicion that the virus was
transmitted by airborne particles or fomites (7).
The largest epidemic (425 presumptive cases and 224
deaths) occurred from August 30, 2000 (i.e., the earliest
presumptive case), to January 9, 2001 (i.e., onset of the last
case), in the Republic of Uganda, which borders both the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (8–11). Since
then, epidemics have been occurring with increasing fre-
quency. Specifically, between December 2001 and March
2002, outbreaks occurred in the Republic of Gabon (65
cases and 53 deaths) (12,13) and in the neighboring
Republic of Congo (57 cases and 43 deaths) (12). In
February 2003, cases again began to be reported in the
Republic of Congo, where 13 laboratory-confirmed case-
patients and 127 epidemiologically linked case-patients,
including 123 deaths, have been reported to date (14).
During the epidemic in Uganda, a national task force, in
collaboration with an international team of health profes-
sionals, conducted activities for controlling the epidemic
and managing cases (11). The area in which the epidemic
was mainly concentrated was the Gulu District, a savannah
area located in the north and mainly inhabited by Nilotic
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tal patients.tribes. Most of the district’s 400,000 inhabitants live in
Gulu Town or in one of several camps, located in rural
areas, for persons who have been internally displaced
because of the insecurity caused by the activity of insur-
gents. 
On October 8, an outbreak of EHF was suspected at St
Mary’s Hospital Lacor (hereafter termed Lacor Hospital),
a nonprofit facility located several kilometers from Gulu
Town. Two days later, isolation wards were set up in the
district’s major hospitals, i.e., Lacor Hospital and the Gulu
Government Hospital. In Lacor Hospital, only the hospital
staff provided patient care in the isolation ward, whereas in
the Gulu Government Hospital, relatives were allowed to
contribute, which is the usual practice in Ugandan hospi-
tals. The staff of both hospitals adopted strict barrier nurs-
ing precautions (e.g., gloves, masks, gowns, aprons, rubber
boots); in the Gulu Government Hospital, these precau-
tions were partially extended to patients’ relatives. On
October 15, the outbreak was confirmed, and a system of
daily case reporting, including a computerized database,
was established. A case-patient was defined as a person
who experienced at least one of the following events
(9,10): 1) unexplained bleeding; 2) abrupt onset of fever
and three or more of the following symptoms or signs:
headache, vomiting, anorexia, diarrhea, weakness, or
severe fatigue, abdominal pain, body aches or joint pain,
difficulty in swallowing, difficulty in breathing, and hic-
cups; and 3) death from unexplained causes.
On October 21, 2000, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) set up a laboratory for performing
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs) for Ebola
antigens and antibodies and reverse transcriptase-poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at Lacor Hospital.
Laboratory confirmation (positive result for Ebola virus
antigen or Ebola immunoglobulin [Ig] G antibody) was
obtained for 218 (51.3%) of the total 425 presumptive
cases involved in the epidemic (9,10).
At approximately the same time, a surveillance system
for contact tracing and case finding was established. A
contact was defined as a person who had at least one of the
following exposures: 1) physical contact with a case-
patient, alive or dead; 2) slept in the same hut or house
with a case-patient during the disease period; 3) contact
with a case-patient’s body fluids during the disease period;
and 4) contact with a case-patient’s linens or other possible
fomites during the disease period and just after death.
Members of the surveillance teams and the hospital staff
were not considered contacts, even if they were exposed to
a case-patient, because they had been taught how to protect
themselves. For each case-patient, a list of contacts was
created; all contacts were followed by daily home visits for
21 days (maximum incubation period) from the last con-
tact with the case-patient (11).
In November and December 2000, we collected addi-
tional data from a group of contacts (or their proxies) con-
cerning the nature and timing of their exposure to case-
patients. Our objective was to trace chains of transmission
and identify risk factors for transmission among a group of
exposed persons in the community. This study, the results
of which are reported here, was fully integrated into the
surveillance activities described above and was authorized
by the director of the Gulu District Health Services and the
Ugandan Ministry of Health.
Methods
Study Design and Population
To retrospectively trace the chain of transmission, we
interviewed three laboratory-confirmed case-patients in
the Lacor Hospital who had onset of symptoms October
23–28 (referred to as “study case-patients”; see Table 1 for
other definitions). We asked them to identify the persons
from whom they had probably acquired the disease
(referred to as index patients). In turn, the index patients
(or their next of kin living in the same village if they had
died, as was usually the case) were then asked to identify
the persons from whom they had probably acquired the
disease (also referred to as index patients). This process
was repeated until we reached the patients whose source of
infection could no longer be identified (referred to as pri-
mary case-patients). For each of the index patients and pri-
mary case-patients, we then reviewed the list of persons
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Table 1. Definitions used in the chain of transmission of Ebola 
hemorrhagic fever 
Classification  Definition 
Study patients  The three laboratory-confirmed case-
patients from whom we retrospectively 
identified the other case-patients and 
their contacts 
Index patients  The nine case-patients retrospectively 
identified from the study patients as the 
source of infection (including primary 
case-patients) 
Primary case-patients  The three earliest patients for whom we 
were not able to identify the source of 
infection 
Collateral case-patients  Cases generated by the index patients, or 
by other collateral case-patients, and 
identified by matching the list of contacts 
of these persons with the list of reported 
cases 
Postprimary case-patients  Case-patients for whom we were able to 
identify the source of infection 
Contacts  Persons exposed to a case-patient, listed 
by the surveillance teams using the 
definition reported in the background 
section.  
Healthy contacts  Contacts in whom the disease did not 
develop within 21 days of the last 
exposure with whom they had been in contact since the onset of their
symptoms; such information had been routinely collected
as part of surveillance. Then, as 21 days had passed since
the last exposure, each name on the list  was matched with
a name on the list of reported case-patients in order to
identify the contacts in whom the disease had developed
(collateral case-patients). The process was then repeated
prospectively with the collateral case-patients for as many
generations as possible.
To identify risk factors, we interviewed all of the iden-
tified contacts (or their proxies) of the primary, index, and
collateral case-patients, irrespective of their status (patient
or healthy contact). To this end, we developed a question-
naire that focused on the exact type and timing of exposure
to index patients.
Data Analysis and Statistical Methods
We performed univariate analyses to evaluate the
strength of associations between the different types of expo-
sure and disease, by comparing disease prevalence among
persons with a given exposure to that among persons with-
out that exposure and by testing the resulting differences
with the chi-square test or, when appropriate, the Fisher
exact test. Those risk factors independently associated with
the disease were evaluated in multivariate analyses by using
log-binomial regression models after we ascertained the
absence of a significant multiple colinearity among the
variables. The crude and adjusted prevalence proportion
ratios (PPR) and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) were
used to describe the strength of the associations (15).
Results
Chains of Transmission
The Figure illustrates the three reconstructed chains of
transmission; each consisted of three identified genera-
tions of cases (excluding the study case-patients). The 27
identified case-patients consisted of, in addition to the 3
laboratory-confirmed patients with whom we began the
study, 9 index case-patients (including 3 primary case-
patients, all young women whose source of infection was
unknown), and 15 collateral case-patients. Of the 24 post-
primary patients, 14 (58.3%) lived in the Gulu Town or
Municipality, and 10 (41.7%) lived in rural areas of the
Gulu District. One patient was a newborn, and three were
infants. The remaining 20 patients (83.3%) ranged in age
from 14 to 70 years; 14 (70.0%) of these 20 patients were
female, and most were housewives or subsistence farmers
(70.0%).
The 24 postprimary patients had onset of symptoms
from September 18 to October 28, 2000. The incubation
period (i.e., time elapsed between either the last or the first
contact with the index patient and the onset of symptoms)
was 1–16 days (median 6 days), when the last contact was
considered, and 1–12 days (median 12 days), when the
first contact was considered. All three infants had an incu-
bation period of <7 days.
Twenty (83.3%) of the 24 postprimary case-patients
were admitted to the hospital;13 (65.0%) were admitted
after the isolation ward had been created. The four patients
not admitted to the hospital (a newborn, two infants, and
an elderly woman) died within 3 to 11 days of disease
onset. Of the 20 hospital patients, 7 were still in the hospi-
tal when the laboratory was set up, and 3 were admitted
afterwards; all 10 of these patients tested positive for Ebola
antigens, IgG, or both.
Of the 20 hospitalized patients, 15 died. Among these
15 patients, the duration of illness (from onset of symp-
toms to death) was 3–15 days (median 10 days); the dura-
tion of hospitalization (from admission to death) was 2–11
days (median 5 days). Among the five surviving patients,
the duration of illness (from onset of symptoms to dis-
charge upon clinical recovery) was 10–25 days (median 15
days); the duration of hospitalization was 8–22 days
(median 13 days).
Of the 27 patients, all of the primary and secondary
case-patients died. Of the remaining 17 patients, 12
(70.6%) died. Of the four persons who died without being
admitted to the hospital, two had secondary cases and two
had tertiary cases.
In the legend to the Figure, the 27 cases are briefly
described and the mode of transmission is summarized for
the 24 postprimary cases. The newborn (case-patient 20)
was delivered by a sick woman 4 days after the onset of
symptoms, and the other three infants (case-patients 2, 9,
and 26) had been breastfed by sick mothers. The other 20
postprimary cases were all members of the extended fam-
ily (household contacts) of the case-patients to whom they
had been exposed. All but one (95%) had had direct phys-
ical contact with the patient who was the likely source of
their disease; the remaining person (case-patient 7) had
slept wrapped up in a blanket left by his brother, who had
just died of EHF.
Among the 20 postprimary case-patients who were >14
years of age, 15 (75.0%) reported that they had been
exposed to the body fluids of their index patient; 11
(55.0%) had washed the index patient’s clothes; and 18
(90.0%) had taken care of the index patient at some point
during his or her illness. Twelve of these 18 persons had
taken care of the index patient until death, either in the hos-
pital (n = 6) or at home (n = 6). Eleven (55.0%) of these 20
postprimary patients had slept in the same hut or house as
the index patient; of these, 5 had slept with the index
patient on the same mat or mattress. Six (30.0%) of these
20 postprimary patients had shared meals with index
patients (picking up food with their fingers from the same
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patients had attended the funeral of their index patient; 11
had also prepared the body for the ceremony or simply
touched the dead body; 11 had participated in the commu-
nal meal during the ceremony; and 7 had participated in
the ritual handwashing during the ceremony.
Healthy Contacts
We also interviewed the 65 apparently healthy contacts
of the 9 index patients and 15 collateral case-patients.
Notably, not all patients generated contacts, and the six
who did not were all third- (n = 5) or fourth-generation
case-patients. Five had had onset of symptoms after the
isolation ward was created.
Of the 65 healthy contacts, 39 (60.0%) lived in the Gulu
Municipality and 23 (35.4%) in rural areas of the Gulu
District; information on residence was not available for the
remaining three. Two of the healthy contacts (3.1%) were
infants, and four (6.2%) were 3–8 years of age The remain-
ing 59 (90.8%) ranged in age from 10 to 70 years; 33
(55.9%) were female; most were housewives or subsis-
tence farmers (60.0%).
One of the two infants had been separated from his sick
mother early in the course of the mother’s illness; the other
infant had been breastfed during his mother’s illness. All
four of the children 3–8 years of age had slept in the same
hut as their sick parent and had had direct physical contact
with their sick parent or relative (none of them had taken
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Figure. Chains of transmission relative to 27 Ebola cases, Gulu District, Uganda (September–October 2000). The numbers above the
blocks indicate the total number of healthy contacts identified for that patient. The slashes indicate patients who died. The isolation ward
was opened on October 8. *A laboratory facility for serologic diagnosis of Ebola was set up at Lacor Hospital by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention on October 21. Description of individual cases follows: 1. AF, young woman, admitted at Gulu Hospital Sept. 19,
died the same day. She was buried the following day, next to her parents’ house, without known identified case-patients among those who
attended the burial ceremony; 2. OS, son of AF (4 months old); breastfed even during the last days of his mother’s life; admitted to Lacor
Hospital; died Sept. 30. 3. OA, father-in-law of AF; nursed his daughter-in-law during the last days of the disease, both at home and in the
hospital; reported contact with blood and vomit; died Oct. 7. 4. AR, grandmother of OS; nursed the child after the mother’s death; report-
ed contact with feces and urine; survived. 5. ON, cousin of OA, whom ON touched before and after OA’s death; no reported contacts with
body fluid; died Oct. 16. 6. OR, brother of OA; nursed him during last days; reported contacts with feces; died Oct. 17. 7. OJ, brother of
ON; used the blanket left by his brother; survived. 8. AE, young woman who sold beer to soldiers; died Sept. 17. 9. OS, son of AE; breast-
fed; died Sept. 21. 10. AD, mother of AE; nursed her; reported contact with vomit and feces; prepared the dead body; died Oct. 1. 11. AJ,
sister of AE; nursed her; reported contact with feces and vomit; prepared the dead body; died Oct. 4. 12. AV, aunt of OS; nursed the child
after the mother’s death; reported contact with vomit and feces; died Oct. 11. 13. AN, cousin of OS; they slept together; reported contact
with vomit and feces; survived. 14. AV, daughter of AD; nursed her; reported contact with vomit and feces; died Oct. 7. 15. AV, niece of AD;
reported direct contact with her during illness; died Oct. 23. 16. AS, daughter of AJ; nursed her, both at home and in the hospital; no report-
ed contact with body fluids; died Oct. 24. 17. AS, co-wife of A J; nursed her; reported contact with blood; died Oct. 24. 18. AE, sister-in-law
of AJ; assisted her during delivery on Sept. 28; died Oct. 17. 19. LV, aunt of AJ; assisted her during delivery on Sept. 28; died Oct. 22. 20.
OW, son of AJ; born on Sept. 28; died Oct. 9. 21. OJ, husband of LV; nursed her; died Nov. 1. 22. AC, cousin of AV; nursed her; reported
contact with feces; survived. 23. AG, young woman; lived next to the barracks; died Oct. 8. 24. AL, sister of AG; nursed her; reported con-
tact with vomit; died Oct. 18. 25. JB, sister of AG; nursed her; reported contact with vomit; died Oct. 26. OR, son of AL; breastfed; died
Oct. 21. 27. AF, grandmother of OR; nursed the child after the mother’s death; reported contact with feces and vomit; survived.care of the sick person). None of these four children was
reported to have been in contact with the patient’s body
fluids.
Of the 59 healthy contacts >10 years of age, 50 (84.7%)
were extended family members of the patient (household
contacts); 9 were neighbors of the patient. Forty-seven
(79.7%) had had direct physical contact with the case-
patient; 15 (25.4%) had been exposed to body fluids; 18
(30.5%) had washed the patient’s clothes; and 25 (42.4%)
had taken care of the sick person. Of these 25 persons, 11
had taken care of their relative up to the last days of life,
either in the hospital (n = 8) or at home (n = 3). Moreover,
13 (22.0%) had slept in the same hut as the patient; 4 had
shared the same mat; 7 (11.9%) had shared meals with the
index patient (picking up food with their fingers from the
same plate).
Thirty-seven (62.7%) of these 59 healthy contacts had
attended the funeral of the patient; 14 of them had also
touched the dead body. In addition, 14 healthy contacts had
participated in the communal meal during the ceremony,
and 9 had participated in the ritual handwashing. 
Risk Factors
Because of their particular exposures, infants <2 years
were excluded from the analysis of risk factors. Among the
83 remaining contacts, disease developed in 20. Sixty-
three contacts remained healthy. Among contacts, neither
age (>30 years vs. ?30 years: PPR = 1.38, 95% CI 0.64 to
2.97) nor sex (women vs. men: PPR = 1.54, 95% CI 0.66
to 3.60) was significantly associated with the disease
(Table 2).
Contact with body fluids showed a strong association
(PPR = 5.30, 95% CI 2.14 to 13.14). Persons who had
had direct physical contact with a sick person were more
likely to have acquired the disease (PPR = 3.53, 95% CI
0.52 to 24.11), as were those who had touched the body
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Table 2. Univariate analysis of risk factors for Ebola hemorrhagic fever among a population of 83 contacts, Gulu, Uganda, 2000 
Risk factors  No. of cases (%)  Crude PPR (95% CI)
a  p value 
Demographic characteristics       
Sex       
Male  6 (18.2)  1   
Female  14 (28.0)  1.54 (0.66 to 3.60)  0.446 
Age group (y)       
<30  9 (20.5)  1   
>30   11 (28.2)  1.38 (0.64 to 2.97)  0.571 
Direct transmission       
Touched sick person       
No  1 (7.7)  1   
Yes  19 (27.1)  3.53 (0.52 to 24.11)  0.173 
Touched body of deceased person       
No  9 (17.6)  1   
Yes  11 (34.4)  1.95 (0.91 to 4.17)  0.141 
Contact with body fluids       
No  5 (9.4)  1   
Yes  15 (50.0)  5.30 (2.14 to 13.14)  <0.001 
Indirect transmission       
Shared meals       
No  14 (20.6)  1   
Yes  6 (40.0)  1.94 (0.89 to 4.22)  0.178 
Washed clothes       
No  9 (18.8)  1   
Yes  11 (31.4)  1.68 (0.78 to 3.60)  0.283 
Slept in the same hut/on the same mat       
No  9 (16.4)  1   
Shared only the hut  6 (35.3)  2.16 (0.90 to 5.19)   
Shared also the same mat  5 (45.5)  2.78 (1.15 to 6.70)  0.019 (for trend) 
Ritual handwashing during funeral       
No  13 (19.4)  1   
Yes  7 (43.7)  2.25 (1.08 to 4.72)  0.054 
Communal meal during funeral       
No  9 (15.5)  1   
Yes  11 (44.0)  2.84 (1.35 to 5.98)  0.012 
aPPR, prevalence proportion ratios; CI, confidence interval. of the deceased person (PPR = 1.95, 95% CI 0.91 to
4.17), although these associations were not statistically
significant.
Regarding indirect transmission, sleeping on the same
mat (PPR = 2.78, 95% CI 1.15 to 6.70), participating in the
ritual handwashing during the funeral ceremony (PPR =
2.25, 95% CI 1.08 to 4.72), and sharing a communal meal
during the funeral ceremony (PPR = 2.84, 95% CI 1.35 to
5.98) were significantly associated with disease. Although
the differences were not statistically significant, sharing
meals, washing clothes, and sleeping in the same hut were
associated with a higher risk of acquiring the disease.
In general, having taken care of a sick person represent-
ed a strong risk factor, although the level of risk was lower
for persons who had provided care only at the early stage
of the disease (PPR = 6.00, 95% CI 1.33 to 27.10), fol-
lowed by the risk for those who provided care until the
index patient’s death, either at the hospital (PPR = 8.57,
95% CI 1.95 to 37.66) or at home (PPR = 13.33, 95% CI
3.20 to 55.59) (Table 3).
The risk tended to increase with the increasing number
of different types of direct contact (chi square for trend p <
0.001); the risk was higher among persons who were
exposed through two (PPR = 1.94, 95% CI 0.30 to 12.94)
or three different types of direct contact (PPR = 4.00, 95%
CI 0.64 to 25.02), compared with the risk for those who
had no direct contact (Table 3).
Factors related to direct and indirect transmission were
analyzed separately in multivariate analyses (Table 4).
The first model (i.e., factors related to direct transmission)
showed that having had contact only with body fluids
(adjusted PPR = 4.61, 95% CI 1.73 to 12.29) was strong-
ly associated with the disease, whereas having only
touched the patient during illness was not (adjusted PPR
= 1.56, 95% CI 0.19 to 13.04). (The weak association
found in the univariate analysis was probably confounded
by contact with the patient’s body fluids.) Having touched
the body of the deceased person (adjusted PPR = 1.84,
95% CI 0.95 to 3.55) showed a borderline significant
association.
The second model (i.e., factors related to indirect trans-
mission and controlled for the potential confounding effect
attributed to the number of different types of direct con-
tact) showed that sleeping in the same hut (adjusted PPR =
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Table 3. Univariate analysis of risk factors for Ebola hemorrhagic fever related to patient care and the number of types of direct contact 
among 83 contacts, Gulu, Uganda, 2000 
Risk factors  No. cases (%)  Crude PPR  (95% CI)
a  p value 
Cared for patient       
No  2 (5.0)  1   
Cared only during patient’s early stage   6 (30.0)  6.00 (1.33 to 27.10)   
Cared until the patient’s death at hospital the hospital  6 (42.9)  8.57 (1.95 to 37.66)   
Cared until the patient’s death at home  6 (66.7)  13.33 (3.20 to 55.59)  <0.001 (for trend) 
Number of types of direct contact       
No direct contact  1 (16.7)  1   
One type of direct contact  1 (2.9)  0.18 (0.01 to 2.45)   
Two types of direct contact  10 (32.3)  1.94 (0.30 to 12.44)   
Three types of direct contact   8 (66.7)  4.00 (0.64 to 25.02)  <0.001 (for trend) 
aPPR, prevalence proportion ratios; CI, confidence interval. 
Table 4. Multivariate analyses on risk factors for Ebola hemorrhagic fever related to direct and indirect transmission among 83  
contacts, Gulu, Uganda, 2000 
Risk factors  Adjusted PPR
a  95% CI
b  p value 
Model 1: Direct transmission       
Touching patient during illness  1.56  0.19 to 13.04  0.679 
Touching dead body  1.84  0.95 to 3.55  0.069 
Contact with patient fluid  4.61  1.73 to 12.29  0.002 
Model 2: Indirect transmission
c       
Sharing meals  1.69  1.00 to 2.85  0.050 
Washing clothes  1.02  0.47 to 2.22  0.957 
Sleeping in the same hut/on the same mat       
 Sharing only the hut  2.34  1.13 to 4.84  0.022 
 Sharing also the mat  2.93  1.16 to 7.38  0.023 
Ritual handwashing during funeral  1.16  0.54 to 2.49  0.706 
Communal meal during funeral  1.50  0.98 to 2.28  0.060 
aPPRs, prevalence proportion ratios adjusted for all the variables included in the model. 
bCI, confidence intervals. 
cModel 2 has been run controlling for the potential confounding effect due to the intensity of direct contacts with a case-patient (less than two types of direct  
contacts versus two or more types of direct contacts). 2.34, 95% CI 1.13 to 4.84) and sleeping on the same mat
(adjusted PPR = 2.93, 95% CI 1.16 to 7.38) were inde-
pendent risk factors. However, weak associations were
found for sharing meals with a sick person and participat-
ing in the communal meal during the funeral, whereas the
ritual handwashing during the funeral and washing the sick
person’s clothes were not risk factors.
Discussion
Although the number of EHF epidemics in sub-Saharan
Africa has been increasing and EHF viruses have recently
been classified as agents that could be used as possible bio-
logical weapons (16), epidemiologic data on the modalities
of transmission are still limited (6) because of the sporadic
and sudden nature of outbreaks. In the Ugandan outbreak,
the hospital isolation wards have been important in manag-
ing cases. This fact was demonstrated by the finding that
the patients with onset of symptoms after the institution of
these wards on October 10 were the only ones who did not
generate contacts, with the exception of an infant born on
September 28, who had onset of symptoms on October 5
and died on October 9. Moreover, the higher death rate
observed among primary and secondary case-patients
(100%), in contrast with that among the most recent case-
patients (70.6%), could be explained by the treatment pro-
vided in the hospital, though this treatment was mainly
supportive.
The reconstruction of the chains of transmission was
straightforward for three generations of case-patients, which
suggests that person-to-person transmission occurred.
Nevertheless, the source of infection of the primary patients
remained unknown, although transmission was occurring in
the community. As described in the Figure, most of the links
in the chain of transmission were deceased; for this reason,
most interviews were administered to proxies. Thus, the
possibility that a nonhuman natural reservoir may have been
involved could not be excluded.
Among the postprimary case-patients, the most impor-
tant risk factor was direct repeated contact with a sick per-
son’s body fluids, as occurs during the provision of care.
As expected, the risk was higher when the exposure took
place during the late stage of the disease at home. The risk
was reduced when the patient stayed in a hospitals, proba-
bly because of the use of gloves, even before strict barrier
nursing was implemented (6,7).
By contrast, simple physical contact with a sick person
appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for contract-
ing EHF. In fact, one person in whom the disease devel-
oped was probably infected by contact with heavily con-
taminated fomites (patient 7), and many persons who had
had a simple physical contact with a sick person did not
become infected.
Transmission through contaminated fomites is appar-
ently possible. In fact, the association found for having
slept on the same mat or having shared meals with a sick
person or with funeral participants remained after control-
ling for direct contact. However, having washed the
clothes of a sick person and having participated in the rit-
ual handwashing during the funeral ceremony were not
significant risk factors.
Finally, although we cannot exclude the possibility of
airborne transmission, this mode probably plays a minor
role, if any. In fact, the association between having slept in
the same hut and acquiring the disease was weak and could
have been produced by some unidentified confounding
variables. Furthermore, the reported Ebola virus aerosol
transmission among nonhuman primates (17,18) has been
demonstrated in laboratory experiments, which may be
irrelevant in the natural context.
Studies conducted during outbreaks cannot be planned
in advance, and the sample size is not predetermined, often
resulting in a low statistical power for detecting significant
associations between exposure and disease. In our study,
the sample size (n = 83) reached a statistical power equal
to 31% to detect as significant a PPR >2 (a total sample
size of 275 would be needed to reach a statistical power
equal to 80%). 
Asking case-patients to identify the persons from
whom they had probably acquired the disease could have
introduced a bias because it implied a preconceived idea
about how the infection was transmitted. However, most
of the case-patients indicated that sick relatives whom
they had cared for were their index patients; moreover, all
of these index patients who were tested had positive
results for Ebola antigens or antibodies. Both of these
facts suggest that this bias did not significantly affect the
results. Moreover, the retrospective design of the study,
conducted in an emergency situation and in part based on
a surveillance system that was created only in the third
week of October, may have made it easier to identify sick
contacts, as opposed to healthy contacts, because of the
effect of recall bias. For this reason, we decided not to cal-
culate the secondary attack rate or the reproductive rate.
Furthermore, the group of uninfected contacts may have
been inadvertently selected in a biased manner. Finally,
the fact that the information was in most cases obtained
from proxies may have also affected the results regarding
risk factors. However, these results contribute to the
knowledge on the patterns of transmission and risk factors
for EHF, which is fundamental for better controlling new
outbreaks.
The results of this study stress the importance of early
detection and isolation of EHF patients in hospitals and the
use of strict barrier nursing precautions in successfully
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controlling EHF outbreaks. Our findings on risk factors
can also contribute to the efforts for educating communi-
ties and preventing the spread of the disease.
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